These are the functions of the state for which the state is not liable under any provision for the wrongful acts of its employees. For example, functions like defense activities, preserving armed forces, maintaining peace and war, diplomacy are some of the sovereign functions for which the state is not liable. Sovereign functions are primary inalienable functions, which only the state can exercise. The defense of the country, raising armed forces, making peace or war, foreign affairs, the power to acquire and retain territory, taxation, maintenance of law and order, internal and external security, the grant of pardon are mentioned in judicial decisions as illustrations of sovereign function. The sovereign functions of the state must necessarily include the maintenance of the army, various departments of the government, for maintenance of law and order, and proper administration of the country which would include magistracy and police and the machinery for administration of justice.
Other functions of the state, including welfare activities, cannot be construed as a sovereign exercise of power. Various functions of the state maybe ramifications of sovereignty, but all cannot be construed as primary inalienable functions. Every governmental function need not fundamentally be sovereign. State activities are multifarious. The dichotomy between sovereign functions and non-sovereign functions can be determined by finding out which of the functions of state could be undertaken by any private person or body; the one which could be undertaken by any private person or body cannot be a sovereign function. Even subjects on which the state has a monopoly may also be non-sovereign in nature. The absence of a profit motive would not take an enterprise out of the ambit of ‘industry’. In fact, the ID Act in terms contemplates cases of ‘industrial disputes’ where the government or the local authority or the public utility service may be the employer.
In view of the expanding activities of the modern state, the industrial adjudication machinery had to spell out the concept of ‘regal’ and ‘sovereign’ functions in the new perspective while interpreting the ambit of the term ‘industry’ under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. In Corporation of Nagpur, the Supreme Court, relying upon the aforesaid legal position stated by Isaacs J, made it clear that it could not have been in the contemplation of the legislature to bring in regal functions of the state within the definition of ‘industry’ and thus confer jurisdiction on industrial tribunals to decide disputes in respect of them.
This Article Does Not Intend To Hurt The Sentiments Of Any Individual Community, Sect, Or Religion Etcetera. This Article Is Based Purely On The Authors Personal Views And Opinions In The Exercise Of The Fundamental Right Guaranteed Under Article 19(1)(A) And Other Related Laws Being Force In India, For The Time Being.