New Delhi, August 2025 – The Supreme Court of India has dismissed a Appeal/Special Leave Petition filed by the National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NCPCR), which sought to challenge a 2022 Punjab and Haryana High Court ruling that recognized the validity of a Muslim minor girl’s marriage under Muslim personal law. The case has drawn national attention, as it sits at the crossroads of personal law autonomy, statutory child protection, and constitutional rights.
Background of the Case
In October 2022, a Pathankot-based couple—Javed and 16-year-old Ashiana (names changed)—approached the Punjab and Haryana High Court, seeking protection of their life and liberty. Their families strongly opposed their marriage, which had been solemnized under Muslim customs. The High Court, while refraining from making a conclusive pronouncement on the overall validity of such marriages, cited principles of Muslim Personal Law, under which a girl who has attained puberty (presumed at 15) is competent to marry.
The Court directed the police to provide protection to the couple, observing that even if their marriage was against the wishes of their families, they could not be deprived of their fundamental rights to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
NCPCR’s Challenge Before the Supreme Court
The NCPCR, India’s statutory child rights body, challenged this order before the Supreme Court. Its arguments were twofold:
Conflict with Statutory Law: The Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (PCMA) sets the minimum age for marriage at 18 years for women and 21 for men. Allowing a 16-year-old to marry under personal law effectively undermines this legislation.
Protection under POCSO: The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 criminalizes sexual consent below 18 years of age. Thus, recognizing such marriages risks normalizing what would otherwise be statutory rape under POCSO.
The Commission urged the Court to rule that personal law should not override statutory safeguards enacted to protect children from exploitation.
Supreme Court’s Ruling
A Bench comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice R. Mahadevan dismissed the NCPCR’s Appeal/Special Leave Petition in August 2025. The Court held that the NCPCR had “no locus standi” to challenge the High Court’s limited protection order, which was case-specific and focused only on safeguarding the couple’s right to security.
The Bench observed that the petition did not raise a substantial question of law that warranted interference under Article 136. Importantly, the Court drew a distinction between genuine teenage romantic relationships and criminal acts of sexual exploitation covered by POCSO, emphasizing the need for judicial sensitivity in such cases.
By dismissing the plea, the Supreme Court left the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s order undisturbed, without directly addressing the deeper conflict between personal law and child protection statutes.
The Question of Locus Standi
At the heart of the dismissal was the principle of locus standi—a legal doctrine determining who has the right to bring a case before the court.
This case is also called the Judges Transfer case. It mainly dealt with the appointment and transfer of judges but became famous for its discussion on locus standi.
Court’s view on locus standi: Before this case, only a person who was directly affected by a wrong could approach the court. But Justice P.N. Bhagwati, in this case, widened the rule. He held that if a public wrong or violation of constitutional rights affects people who cannot themselves approach the court (for example, the poor, illiterate, or disadvantaged), then any public-spirited individual can file a case on their behalf.
Why it matters: This case laid the foundation for Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in India. It liberalized locus standi in public matters but also clarified that in individual disputes, the affected person should normally be the one to approach the court.
Relevance here: NCPCR tried to rely on its role as a child rights body to claim standing. However, the Supreme Court held that this case was not a larger public wrong, but an individual protection matter, where the High Court had only ensured the couple’s right to life under Article 21. Therefore, S.P. Gupta’s liberal rule did not apply.
In this case, a third party (H.S. Chowdhary, a lawyer) tried to interfere in a criminal case involving a political leader by filing petitions even though he was not directly affected.
Court’s view on locus standi: The Supreme Court dismissed the case, saying that a “stranger” with no personal interest cannot jump into someone else’s dispute. The Court warned against misuse of PILs and observed that “locus standi is necessary to prevent busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, and people with oblique motives from misusing the judicial process.”
Why it matters: This case shows the limits of locus standi—while courts allow broader standing in public interest cases (like in S.P. Gupta), they do not allow outsiders to interfere in private or criminal disputes where they have no direct stake.
Relevance here: The Supreme Court applied this reasoning to hold that the NCPCR was effectively a third-party intervener in a personal dispute. Since the couple themselves had not challenged the High Court’s order, the NCPCR could not step in to overturn it.
What happened: This case involved service matters where a person challenged appointments and promotions of others even though he was not directly affected.
Court’s view on locus standi: The Supreme Court held that only a person who suffers a legal injury or whose rights are directly affected can maintain a writ petition. A person who has no personal grievance cannot use the court just because they feel something wrong has happened.
Why it matters: This case reaffirmed the principle that in personal or service-related disputes, only directly affected parties can approach the court. It tightened the scope of locus standi, ensuring judicial time is not wasted on frivolous claims.
Relevance here: The NCPCR had not suffered any legal injury from the High Court’s protection order. The affected parties were only the couple and their families. Hence, applying this principle, the Supreme Court said the NCPCR had no locus stand
Broader Constitutional Conflict-
While the decision resolved the technical question of standing, it left open the larger constitutional dilemma:
This conflict has surfaced in several earlier High Court decisions, with divergent rulings. For instance, the Delhi High Court (2012) and Karnataka High Court (2022) have grappled with similar questions, often arriving at different conclusions depending on whether the marriage was voluntary or coerced.
Implications and the Road Ahead
The Supreme Court’s dismissal demonstrates judicial restraint, choosing not to expand the scope of the case beyond its immediate facts. However, it leaves significant policy and constitutional questions unanswered.
Legal experts suggest that a Constitution Bench may eventually need to settle whether personal law provisions allowing puberty-based marriages are valid in light of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act and POCSO. Until then, lower courts will continue to face dilemmas in balancing individual liberty, cultural autonomy, and child protection.
For now, the ruling underscores how locus standi acts as a gatekeeper principle, determining who can bring disputes before the judiciary even when issues of wider public importance are at stake.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s rejection of the NCPCR plea marks a significant moment in the ongoing debate over the intersection of personal law and statutory child protection. While the Court shielded itself from engaging in a constitutional showdown, the unresolved tension ensures that the debate will resurface in future litigation. Until then, the rights of minors in such marriages remain governed by a complex interplay of personal law, statutory mandates, and constitutional interpretation.
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