Federation of Bank of India Staff Unions and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.:

Present case was related to nomination of a Director from workman/employee category falling in Clause (e) of Section 9(3) of Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970/1980 and also related to his disqualification for being nominated as a Director in that category. Management of the Bank called upon Appellants to furnish a panel of three workers/employees for being nominated as a Director in order of preference in category of "Workman Director" in the Board of Directors. Appellants, in compliance with request made by Respondent No. 2, sent a panel of three names of workers/employees in order of preference to Central Government by their letter. Secretary, Government of India however, informed Appellants that, since all three workers/employees, whose names were sent, had less than three years of residual service before their superannuation, therefore it was not possible to nominate any of workers/employees as Director in Board of Directors. Appellants were accordingly requested to send a fresh panel of names to enable Central Government to nominate one, out of three new names, as Director in Board of Directors. Appellants instead of sending fresh three names submitted their representation and requested Central Government to re-consider matter afresh and nominate any one out of three names already sent by them. But Central Government did not accede to request made by Appellants and insisted on them to send fresh names of workers/employees. Appellants felt aggrieved and filed a writ petition in High Court. In that writ petition, Appellants (writ Petitioners) sought quashing of communication of Respondent No. 1 by which Respondent No. 1 had rejected panel of three names sent by them vide their letter. A writ of mandamus was also prayed commending Respondents to consider nomination penal sent by Appellants vide their letter and nominate one worker/employee as Director out of three names sent by them in Board of Directors. Appellants also sought a declaration that Clause 3 (2) (iii) of Scheme, 1970 be struck down as being ultra vires Constitution. High Court dismissed writ petition.

It was held while dismissing the appeal that challenge to impugned communication dated 10th October, 2009 and enforcement of Appellants' letter dated 08th June, 2009 had been rendered infructuous.

Employees/workers, whose names were recommended by Appellant No. 1 in their letter dated 8th June, 2009 had retired long back. On their retirement, many other persons were nominated as Director out of category of worker/employee in the Board of Directors of the Bank. This relief, therefore, no longer survived for consideration.

It would be clear from a perusal of Clauses (e) and (f) of Section 9(3) of Act that both categories of employees were different-one was worker/employee category as defined under Section 9(3)(e) and other was officer/employee category as defined under Section 9(3)(f) of Act. Second, it was for legislature to decide as to what qualifications and disqualifications should be prescribed for various categories of employees for their nomination on post of Director. Third, there lay a distinction between worker and officer. Former, i.e., worker was defined under Section 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and was governed by that Act whereas latter, i.e., officer was not governed by Industrial Disputes Act but was governed by separate service rules. Both these categories of employees, therefore, could not be equated with each other and nor could be placed at par for providing equal qualification or/and disqualification for their nomination as a Director in Board of Directors. Fourth, Article 14 of Constitution applied inter se two equals and not inter se unequal. Case at hand fell under the latter category and, therefore, reliance placed on principle enshrined under Article 14 of Constitution by Appellants was wholly misplaced. Nominee worker/employee had only a right under Act to be appointed as Director from category of worker/employee in terms of Section 9 (3)(e) of Act provided concerned nominee whose name was recommended by Union fulfilled qualifications laid down in Clause 3(2)(iii) of Scheme but not beyond it.

A mere reading of Section 9(3) Clause (a) to (i) would go to show that, Board of Directors consisted of persons coming from different fields. There could not, therefore, be a uniform qualification or/and disqualification for such persons. Indeed, qualifications and disqualifications were bound to vary from category to category and would depend on post, experience and stream from where a person was being nominated as a Director. Moreover, qualification and disqualification had to be seen prior to his/her becoming a Director and not after his/her appointment as a Director.

There was no good ground to interfere with reasoning and conclusion arrived at by High Court, which rightly dismissed Appellants' writ petition, and upheld Clause 3(2) (iii) of Scheme as being legal. Hence, the appeal is dismissed.